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Abstract 
 
Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of 
parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established 
democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with 
experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and 
emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ 
according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party 
system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects 
experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and 
variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional 
and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, 
but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with 
additional experience with elections.  
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One of the most frequently studied questions in political science regards the effects that 
electoral institutions and social cleavages have on the development of party systems.  This 
literature examines whether party system fragmentation (i.e. the number of political parties) is 
determined by social cleavages, institutional arrangements, or some combination of the two sets 
of variables (e.g. Duverger, 1954; Lijphart, 1999).  Research on the effects of institutions shows 
that in addition to the effects of electoral system properties, changes in the size of the legislative 
party system reflect changes in the size of the presidential party system—due to the greater 
importance voters often attach to presidential elections vis-à-vis parliamentary elections—
conditional on the time between presidential and legislative elections (e.g. Amorim Neto and 
Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006).   
While these variables have been examined extensively in established democracies, the 
effects of these variables have received less attention in developing democracies.  Those studies 
that have examined developing democracies find that the effects of electoral systems and/or 
social cleavages differ from those effects seen in more established democracies (e.g. 
Morgenstern and Vázquez-D’Elía, 2007; Moser, 1999; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003).  
Due to their relative inexperience with elections, voters in new democracies may have difficulty 
understanding the workings of their countries’ electoral systems, and therefore have difficulty 
determining how to behave strategically.  Additionally, voters in new democracies often lack 
information regarding the parties’ issue and ideological positions, the social groups they 
represent, and their relative chances of winning seats due to the lack of previous electoral 
experience to draw upon.   
Drawing from previous research arguing that democracy improves with electoral 
experience (Lindberg, 2004, 2006), we argue that the effects of the standard array of institutional 
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and social cleavage variables are similarly conditioned by electoral experience.  As experience 
with elections increases, the effects of electoral systems, presidential systems, and social 
cleavages increasingly approximate the effects seen in more established democracies.  We test 
this argument using a well-established cross-national data set of elections covering a broad range 
of countries at differing levels of experience with elections (Bormann and Golder, 2013; see also 
Golder, 2005), examining whether the effects of electoral systems, ethnic cleavages, and 
characteristics of the presidential party system on party system fragmentation are conditioned by 
experience with elections.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the literature 
regarding the effects of institutions and social cleavages on party system fragmentation before 
discussing our argument for why the effects of these variables may be conditioned by experience 
with elections.  Following this, we provide the details of our research design before moving to a 
discussion of the results.  The final section concludes with thoughts for future research.   
Institutions, Social Cleavages, and the Number of Parties 
The conventional wisdom maintains that party system fragmentation is determined by an 
interaction between electoral institutions and social cleavages.  The effects of institutions revolve 
around the effects of district magnitude (the number of seats awarded in a constituency), with 
more parties in larger-magnitude districts than smaller-magnitude districts (Cox, 1997; 
Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).  The conventional wisdom regarding the effect of social 
cleavages maintains that greater social cleavage diversity leads to greater party system 
fragmentation (see, for instance, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Lijphart, 1999, p. 62-89).  The 
interaction of these two processes leads to Duverger’s ‘law’ and Duverger’s ‘hypothesis’.  
Duverger’s law holds that low district magnitude (e.g. single-member district plurality systems) 
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limits party system fragmentation, as only two parties will be viable in each district, even in 
highly diverse countries.  Duverger’s hypothesis maintains that social cleavage diversity 
increases party system fragmentation when district magnitude is sufficiently large (and vice 
versa).   
The effects of district magnitude are supported by strategic voting theory, which 
underpins Duverger’s argument vis-à-vis the effects of electoral systems that put downward 
pressure on the number of parties.  According to strategic voting theory, voters in low-magnitude 
districts strategically desert third parties in favour of their second preferences so as not to waste 
votes when they anticipate that their most-preferred party will place third (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook, 1972; Cox, 1997).  Party leaders, for their part, avoid contesting elections in which 
they anticipate placing third (in anticipation of strategic desertion by voters).  Crucial for 
strategic voting and desertion by voters is the assumption that voters possess sufficient 
information to know which parties are likely to place third (Cox, 1997, p. 79).   
In addition to variables related to the legislative electoral system, the conventional 
wisdom holds that party system fragmentation is also affected by presidential elections.  Because 
voters’ attention is drawn primarily to the presidential race, their views toward legislative races 
are affected by their views of the parties in the presidential race.  As a result, legislative party 
system fragmentation increases as the size of the presidential party system increases (Amorim 
Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, 1999; 
Golder, 2006; Jones, 1994, 1999).   
Despite these important theoretical advances, there are reasons to believe more research 
is needed in order to understand the effects of institutions and cleavages on the number of 
parties.  First, most of the existing literature is limited to relatively old, well-established 
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democracies (Cox, 1997; Lijphart, 1999; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994).  While some 
research—particularly the work by Clark and Golder (2006)—has expanded the range of 
countries in which the properties of Duverger’s seminal work have been examined, most 
research still remains confined to well-established democracies.  
More importantly, many studies examining developing democracies find that the effects 
of institutions and cleavages do not always conform to the expectations of the literature (e.g. 
Morgenstern and Vázquez-D’Elía, 2007; Moser, 1999).  Some research goes so far as to argue 
the effects of institutions and cleavages on party systems work in ways that contradict the 
expectations of the literature (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003; though see also Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder, 2007).  Thus, there is need for additional research to explain the patterns of 
party system fragmentation in newer democracies in a way that incorporates these divergent 
findings into the standard model of institutional and social cleavage effects.   
The Conditioning Effects of Experience with Elections 
One explanation for the divergent patterns of party system fragmentation between new 
and established democracies is that the effects of social cleavages and institutions may be 
conditioned by experience with elections.  Voters and parties in new democracies—including 
democracies re-emerging after democratic breakdowns or military occupations—often start out 
lacking considerable information about one another.  As a result, voters and parties do not know 
how to interact with one another, resulting in institutional and cleavage effects in new 
democracies that may differ substantially from more established democracies.  With each 
successive election, giving voters and parties more chances to interact with one another, parties 
learn which strategies to follow and which voters to target, whilst voters learn how to make their 
votes count most effectively.  When experience with elections is interrupted, however, the 
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learning process for voters and parties begins again.   
From the perspective of voters, a lack of experience with elections impedes their ability 
to prevent wasted votes from being cast for parties that do not stand a chance of winning 
representation.  Even in countries with some past experience with elections, trying to decide for 
which party one should vote following the (re-) instalment of electoral processes is difficult.  
Voters lack information about what the parties stand for, to which social groups each party 
intends to appeal, what the relative strength of each party is, and ultimately how to use this 
information in order to understand how the electoral system operates.  Only with electoral 
experience can voters hope to acquire all of this information.  In particular, absent knowledge 
about the relative strength of each party prior to the election, many voters in single-member 
district plurality systems will vote for a party that does not stand a chance of winning seats that 
they would not have voted for had they possessed such information (instead, voting strategically 
for a party with a better chance of winning).  Similarly, in proportional representation systems, 
voters in countries with limited electoral experience may think they are voting strategically for a 
less-preferred party when in fact the electoral system is proportional enough for their most-
preferred party to have won seats.   
From the perspective of political parties, a lack of experience with elections also limits 
the degree to which parties can adjust their behaviour in order to maximize vote and seat shares.  
Without recent electoral experience to draw upon, parties struggle to learn which voters they 
appeal to, what issues voters care about, and ultimately how much electoral strength they can 
expect to command.  Without this information, parties find it difficult to determine which 
electoral strategies to follow—what levels of effort and resources to put into the campaign and 
which districts they should compete in (or whether they should compete as a party at all)—in 
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order to maximize seat shares so as not to waste resources, especially on hopeless campaigns.  
As a result of these processes among both voters and parties, the effects of institutions and 
cleavages in new democracies may differ substantially from more established democracies.   
This argument is consistent with recent work claiming democracy itself is something that 
is learned.  Drawing from notions of democratization that view democracy as a process of 
‘learning-by-doing’ (Lindberg, 2004, 2006; see also Diamond, 1999), this literature holds that 
democratization—and the quality of democracy more generally—improves with each successive 
election.  Regardless of the quality of earlier elections, conducting elections not only confers a 
sense of legitimacy on the elections and fosters a sense of entitlement to high(er)-quality 
elections, but also fosters learning on the part of voters and parties.  With each consecutive 
election, the likelihood of holding future elections (and freer and fairer elections) increases.  This 
supports the expectation that consecutive experience with elections will condition the effects of 
institutions and social cleavages on party system fragmentation.  However, when experience with 
elections is interrupted, parties and voters must re-learn where each other stands after electoral 
processes are restored in order to behave strategically.  When this happens, the collection of 
experience with elections begins again, as parties sometimes change labels and/or their targeted 
base of voters between elections, while new parties enter the system trying to take advantage of 
the uncertainty of the new electoral environment.   
Also consistent with our argument is the research demonstrating the importance of 
accurate information about party competition to voting behaviour.  Consistent with both our 
argument and strategic voting theory, recent research has demonstrated the importance of 
possessing accurate information about the parties’ chances, showing that the absence of accurate 
information is sufficient to produce third-party voting in plurality systems that would not occur if 
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voters possessed accurate information (Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Clough, 2007; Forsythe et al., 
1993).  Parties and voters in countries characterised by frequent periods of unelected rule—
especially those with little-to-no experience with elections—lack information about the parties’ 
relative chances.  As a result, both parties and voters lack the ability to behave strategically in 
line with the expectations associated with Duverger’s law and the predictions it makes regarding 
the effects of institutions and social cleavages.   
Hampering the ability of voters to acquire sufficient information to vote strategically is 
the fact that many parties in democratising countries adopt ideologically inconsistent positions 
and have often failed to represent clear social-group bases in the first few elections (e.g. Dix, 
1989; Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998).  As a result, newly democratised countries face high levels 
of electoral volatility (Bogaards, 2008; Epperly, 2011; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999) and low 
levels of party system institutionalization (Casal Bertoa, 2012; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 
Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).  Both electoral volatility and lack of institutionalization hamper 
the ability of voters to learn where parties stand and vote strategically.  Over time, however, as 
parties institutionalise, adopting more consistent positions (e.g. Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Lewis 
2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009), voters are able to learn where parties stand on major 
issues with implications for their particular social groups (Evans and Whitefield, 2006) 
The result of party institutionalisation and learning is a reduction in wasted voting.  
Previous research shows that support for parties with little chance of winning representation 
diminishes as experience with democracy increases (Dawisha and Deets, 2006; Lago and 
Martinez i Coma, 2012; Tavits and Annus, 2006).  Other research examining district-level party 
systems demonstrates that wasted votes, support for hopeless parties, and other coordination 
failures preventing strategic voting are more common in countries with less electoral experience 
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than more established democracies (Crisp, Olivella, and Potter, 2012; Moser and Scheiner, 2009; 
Riera, 2013).   
Taken together, this literature suggests that experience with elections conditions the 
impact of electoral systems on party system fragmentation.  Due to a lack of party 
institutionalisation and the resulting electoral volatility, voters in developing democracies lack 
the necessary information about the parties to vote strategically.  As a result, low district 
magnitudes may not limit party system fragmentation in countries with limited electoral 
experience.  However, with additional experience, voters will learn more about the parties in 
order to determine how to behave strategically, resulting in fewer wasted votes and thus reducing 
party system fragmentation in low-magnitude settings.   
Similar to the impact that a lack of experience with elections can have on the effects of 
electoral system properties, a lack of experience with elections can also hamper the translation of 
social cleavages into political parties, producing relationships between social diversity and party 
system fragmentation that are contradictory to those seen in more established democracies.  As 
part of the process of voters learning what parties stand for and parties learning to which voters 
their policies appeal (e.g. Evans and Whitefield, 2006), too many parties may emerge to contest 
the earliest elections in countries with less experience with elections and low-to-moderate social 
diversity, resulting in more wasted votes than established democracies with similar institutional 
and social profiles.  In more diverse countries, less experience may reverse this effect and 
produce lower party system fragmentation than established democracies.  This can be seen most 
clearly in several African party systems, which are characterised by high social diversity yet low 
party system fragmentation (Bogaards, 2004; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008).  These low levels of 
party system fragmentation occur in part because presidents often try to build the broadest 
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coalitions possible in order to limit the effects that defection by any one ethnic group can have 
on their tenure in office (Hyden, 2006: 103-104), and because opposition parties are often too 
busy competing among themselves to provide coherent policy programmes to their voters 
(Lindberg, 2006).  However, with each successive election, opposition parties begin to organise 
and compete more effectively, resulting in higher levels of support (Lindberg, 2004).  Thus, the 
effect of social cleavage diversity in countries with less experience with elections may differ 
considerably from the effect seen in more established democracies, possibly producing a 
negative effect on party system fragmentation.  As experience with elections increases and 
opposition parties become more organised, the effect of social diversity may begin to produce 
increases in party system fragmentation (as is the case in established democracies).   
Finally, in addition to the effects of district magnitude on legislative party system 
fragmentation, the ‘coattail effects’ of presidential systems on legislative party systems noted by 
previous research (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006; Filippov, Ordeshook, 
and Shvetsova, 1999; Golder, 2006; Jones, 1994, 1999) may also be conditioned by experience 
with elections.  Namely, we expect that as experience with elections increases, voters and parties 
become better able to recognise when supporting certain presidential candidates’ parties in 
legislative elections will result in wasted votes.  This, in turn, leads to a reduction in the coattail 
effects from presidential races to legislative party systems.   
Research Design 
To determine whether institutional and social cleavage effects differ according to 
countries’ degree of experience with elections, we examine the effects of these variables using 
Matt Golder’s (2005) cross-national data set, which was used by Clark and Golder (2006) in their 
influential study of the interaction effects of institutional and social cleavage variables.  Because 
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the time series in Golder’s (2005) data set ends in 2000, we use the updated data set produced by 
Bormann and Golder (2013).  After all controls are included, this data set contains elections from 
89 countries covering the years from 1946-2011.
1
  All countries included in the data set (though 
not necessarily all elections) meet the democratic criteria set forth by Przeworski et al. (1996).
2
   
In an effort to build upon previous work, we start with the same basic model of 
legislative party system fragmentation examined by Clark and Golder (2006).  Their model is 
framed around the seminal work by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), which predicts the number of 
vote-winning parties using a combination of institutional and social cleavage variables.  
Following this previous work, our dependent variable is the effective number of electoral parties 
(ENEP)—the standard measure of party system fragmentation developed by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979)—from elections to the lower house of countries’ legislatures.  Following the 
practice of Clark and Golder (2006), we also apply the correction to this measure suggested by 
Taagepera (1997), which takes the uncertainty resulting from ‘other’ party categories into 
account.   
To explain the number of parties, we employ two variables related to the legislative 
electoral system: (logged) district magnitude (LogM, the mean number of seats awarded per 
constituency) and the percentage of seats in the lower house allocated in a second (and third, 
where applicable) tier (Upper Tier).  To control for the effects that presidential systems may 
have on the number of parties, we follow the practice of Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Clark 
and Golder (2006) and include variables measuring the effective number of presidential 
candidates (ENPRES), whether legislative and presidential elections were held concurrently 
(Proximity), and an interaction between the two variables.  Descriptive statistics for each variable 
are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.   
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As with previous work testing the interaction effects of electoral institutions and social 
cleavages, we also include a measure of social diversity.  In order to facilitate comparison with 
previous research, we include a measure of the effective number of ethnic groups (Ethnic) 
employed by Clark and Golder (2006), which uses data from Fearon (2003).  In order to 
demonstrate the robustness of the results, we also make use of an alternative source of data on 
the sizes of ethnic groups provided by the Ethnic Power Relations data set, calculating an 
effective number of ethnic groups using these data (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009).  We 
centre both variables to zero (with zero reflecting only one ethnic group).  Following the practice 
of Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Clark and Golder (2006), we create interactions between 
the ethnic diversity variables and both LogM and Upper Tier.   
While the use of ethnic diversity as a proxy for social cleavages of all sorts is clearly 
unsatisfactory, we continue to rely on this measure for two reasons.  First, because previous 
studies have focused on variables measuring ethnic diversity, following the established practice 
makes our results comparable to previous studies, which in turn highlights any important 
differences between our study and previous research.  Second, although focusing on ethnic 
diversity allows us to measure only one type of cleavage, we can at least confidently say that we 
are validly measuring ethnic diversity, and thus can determine whether greater diversity of one 
type of cleavage (ethnicity) leads to increased party system fragmentation.  Although other 
cleavages likely play a role in shaping party system fragmentation, their measurement is more 
difficult from one country to the next.  Thus, while focusing on ethnic diversity alone limits the 
extent to which we can infer about the effects of ‘cleavage’ diversity, it allows us to discuss—at 
a minimum—the effect of one type of cleavage diversity on party system fragmentation.   
To demonstrate the importance of experience with elections, we include a variable 
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measuring consecutive experience with elections.  This variable is coded zero for the first 
election since the last breakdown of democratic elections (or for the first ever democratic 
election), one for the second consecutive election, two for the third consecutive election, three 
for the fourth consecutive election, and four for the fifth (and subsequent) consecutive election.
3
  
We use five or more consecutive elections as the cut-off point for election experience following 
the practice of previous research (Crisp, Olivella, and Potter, 2012; Tavits and Annus, 2006).  In 
determining previous experience with elections, we treat all series of multiparty elections 
(including elections prior to decolonization) that are not broken up by coups d’état or other 
suspensions of multiparty practice (such as wartime occupations and transitions from multiparty 
to one-party or no-party elections) as forming a consecutive series of elections, even if these 
multiparty elections are not fully democratic and/or free and fair.  Dates of coups d’état are taken 
from Powell and Thyne (2011).  This follows the theory and practice of Lindberg (2004, 2006), 
who argues that experience with elections, however flawed, lead to improvements in the quality 
of democracy.  The list of countries and election years at each level of consecutive experience 
with elections is presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix.  We then create interactions between 
this variable and ethnic diversity, district magnitude, the two presidential system variables 
(ENPRES and Proximity), and the interactions among these variables (i.e. between district 
magnitude and ethnic diversity, proximity and ENPRES).  These interactions allow us to estimate 
the effects of ethnic diversity and institutions at different levels of experience with elections.   
Following the practice in Clark and Golder (2006), we use ordinary least squares linear 
regression with standard errors clustered by country.  We analyse the results of two models: one 
using the Fearon measure of ethnic diversity and the other using the Ethnic Power Relations 
measure.  Alternative models—for example, using panel-corrected standard errors—were also 
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estimated, producing less conservative results than those presented here.
4
  Because of this, we 
only present the results using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors.
5
   
Results 
Parameter estimates for each variable are presented in Table 1.  Although the information 
that can be gleaned from the parameter estimates alone is limited in the presence of interaction 
effects, a few points deserve mention.  First, as determined by joint significance tests reported at 
the bottom of Table 1, the interaction effects in both models demonstrate that experience with 
elections has a significant conditioning effect on the three variables of interest: (logged) district 
magnitude, ethnic diversity, and presidential party systems (ENPRES).  Second, while the partial 
effects of the variables related to the presidential party system (i.e. the coefficients themselves, 
which assume all interaction effects are zero) reach statistical significance, the partial effects of 
district magnitude and ethnic diversity are not significant (at least not in the model using the 
Ethnic Power Relations measure of ethnic diversity), with some of these coefficients appearing 
in the opposite direction from that predicted by the literature.  Because these partial effects 
represent the impact of these variables in countries conducting their first elections, these findings 
suggest that significant differences in the effects of these variables exist between countries with 
limited experiences with elections and countries with longer experiences.  Third, it is interesting 
to note that the two models produce very similar estimates.  This demonstrates the robustness of 
the findings using the Fearon measure of ethnic diversity.  Fourth, the partial effect of the 
number of consecutive elections a country has held is negative and statistically significant.  This 
indicates that, ceteris paribus, greater experience with elections reduces party system 
fragmentation: as parties and voters become more familiar with one another, voters come to 
realise that some parties are not viable, and recognizing this, these hopeless parties remove 
14 
 
themselves from the electoral environment.  This can be seen in Figure 1, which presents the 
predicted values of party system fragmentation at different levels of experience with elections, 
holding all other variables to their minimum values.  We comment further on this point below.   
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
Because a complete interpretation of interaction effects requires interpreting the 
coefficients of variables of interest and their moderating variables simultaneously (Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder, 2006), we present and discuss the results using a series of figures.  First, 
regarding the effect of ethnic diversity, Figure 2 presents the predicted values of party system 
fragmentation across the range of the Ethnic variable, again using the results from model 1 and 
assuming a district magnitude of one (i.e. LogM = 0).  We assume this value of district 
magnitude in order to isolate the effect of ethnic diversity in single-member district plurality 
electoral systems that provide incentives against casting wasted votes, where the literature based 
on Duverger’s law predicts that the number of parties should not exceed two.  To determine the 
effect of experience with elections, separate predicted values are presented for the lowest and 
highest levels of experience with elections (one election versus five or more elections).   
Figure 2 about here 
The results demonstrate that the effect of ethnic diversity differs substantially according 
to countries’ experience with elections.  Beginning with countries with little ethnic diversity 
holding their first election, the predicted value of party system fragmentation is effectively 4.20 
parties, which is significantly greater than the predictions of effectively two-party competition in 
single-member district plurality systems.  Contrary to the expectations of the literature, this value 
drops as ethnic diversity increases.  This demonstrates the difficulties facing socially diverse 
countries with little experience with elections (i.e. weakly institutionalised party systems, well-
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funded governing parties, and poorly organised and funded opposition parties that do not 
cooperate with one another).   
As experience with elections accumulates, however, opposition parties coordinate and 
compete more effectively with governing parties, and the effect of increasing ethnic diversity 
becomes positive.  This can be seen among countries having conducted five or more elections: in 
these countries, the effect of ethnic diversity is positive (in keeping with previous literature).  
Additionally, the range of the predicted values is in keeping with previous literature as well.  In 
countries with the lowest levels of ethnic diversity, predicted party system fragmentation is 
around effectively 2.74 parties with five or more consecutive elections.  This is far lower than 
countries conducting their first elections, and roughly in line with the literature’s expectations 
that single-member districts should constrain the number of viable parties to roughly two.  
Higher levels of ethnic diversity produce even larger party system fragmentation.  Although this 
seemingly defies a strict interpretation of Duverger’s law holding that the number of parties will 
not exceed two even in cases of extreme social diversity, this predicted value need not be 
interpreted as a violation of two-party predictions, as the number of parties in any one district 
may still converge on two parties (Cox, 1999; however, see also Raymond, 2013; Singer, 2013).   
Turning to the effects of the electoral system, we again see significant conditioning 
effects due to experience with elections.  Figure 3 presents the predicted values of party system 
fragmentation across the range of LogM in countries holding their first election and countries 
with five or more consecutive elections, holding ethnic diversity at zero.  As noted above, 
previous research maintains that the electoral system should constrain party development at 
lower levels of district magnitude while allowing for multiparty systems to develop at higher 
levels.  The results presented in Figure 3 show that while this is clearly the case for countries 
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with five or more consecutive elections, it is not necessarily the case among countries with more 
limited experience with elections.  Among those countries that have conducted five or more 
consecutive elections, the effect of district magnitude is clearly positive, with the lowest 
predicted values of party system fragmentation at the lowest values of district magnitude (and 
vice versa among high values of district magnitude).  Moreover, these predicted values are 
significantly different from the baseline predicted values (i.e. the constant—effectively 4.20 
parties): lower values of district magnitude are associated with significantly lower predicted 
values of party system fragmentation, while higher values of district magnitude are associated 
with significantly larger predicted values of party system fragmentation.   
Figure 3 about here 
The same cannot be said for countries conducting their first election following a 
transition.  While there is a slight positive slope to the predicted values of party system 
fragmentation across the range of district magnitude, these predicted values are not significantly 
different from the baseline predicted values.  Thus, district magnitude does not have the expected 
effects on party system fragmentation in countries holding their first election.  As the results 
from countries with five or more consecutive elections demonstrate, increasing experience with 
elections will lead to district magnitude having the effect on party system fragmentation that the 
literature expects.   
Finally, turning to the effects of presidential systems on legislative party system 
fragmentation, Figure 4 presents the predicted values of party system fragmentation across the 
range of the variable measuring the effective number of presidential candidates (ENPRES), again 
focusing on the difference between countries holding their first elections since a transition and 
countries holding their fifth (at least) consecutive election.  In order to study the coattail effects 
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of presidential party systems on legislative party systems most clearly, this figure holds the 
proximity between presidential and legislative elections to one (i.e. the most concurrent).  At 
both levels of experience with elections, the results show that the effect of ENPRES is positive 
(and significant).  However, this effect weakens considerably in countries with more experience 
with elections.  These differences become significant at ENPRES values just over 2.5 and 
continue to remain significant across the entire range of values in the figure.
6
  In other words, 
these results show that the spill-over from presidential to legislative party system fragmentation 
is reduced as countries acquire more experience with elections.  While legislators in countries 
with greater experience with elections may still ride the coattails of popular presidential 
candidates (or be dragged down by unpopular presidents), these results suggest that they are not 
as bound to the fate of their party’s presidential candidate as in countries with less experience 
with elections.  Although the results regarding the effect of the size of the presidential party 
system initially seem somewhat dour for party systems in developing democracies, this finding 
actually shows that the spill-over effects from presidential to legislative party systems weaken 
over time.  As the effect of the presidential party system weakens, the effects of district 
magnitude and ethnic diversity are able to exert proportionally more influence on the 
development of legislative party systems.  Considering the authoritarian tendencies and lack of 
competition characterising some countries’ presidential elections, this finding may actually be 
quite positive for legislative party systems in developing democracies.  As with Figures 2 and 3, 
Figure 4 demonstrates that experience with elections also conditions the effects of presidential 
party system fragmentation on legislative party system fragmentation.   
Figure 4 about here 
Taken together, these results demonstrate that experience with elections is an important 
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factor conditioning the effects of the primary institutional and structural variables used to explain 
variation in party system fragmentation cross-nationally.  The effects of ethnic diversity, district 
magnitude, and variables related to the presidential system differ considerably between new and 
established democracies. As countries gain more experience with elections, these effects begin to 
resemble those effects seen in the more democracies.  This suggests that voters and party elites 
face a significant learning curve that affects the appearance of institutional and structural effects 
that can be overcome only by continued practice and experience with democratic elections.   
Returning to the finding noted above that experience with elections tends to reduce party 
system fragmentation, what are the implications of the results for the three variables—district 
magnitude, ethnic diversity, and the size of the presidential party system—for the effect of 
experience with elections?  This discussion is particularly important for those countries with low 
levels of party system fragmentation—especially for those countries with limited party system 
fragmentation despite high levels of ethnic diversity—as reduced party system fragmentation 
resulting from greater experience with elections may result in even less competitive elections, 
thereby reducing its prospects for democratic consolidation.  The findings regarding the effects 
of district magnitude and ethnic diversity bode well for developing democracies, as increases in 
these variables produce significantly larger party systems over time.  Not only are these variables 
conditioned by experience with elections, but these variables in turn condition the negative effect 
that experience with elections has on the size of the party system, reducing it to a nil effect in 
highly proportional and/or highly ethnically diverse societies.  Additionally, while the sign of the 
coefficient for the interaction between experience with elections and the fragmentation of the 
presidential party system is negative, this is not cause for concern.  Rather this negative 
coefficient only indicates that the effect of experience with elections is most negative in 
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countries with very fragmented presidential party systems, which reflects greater need to shed 
excess parties that have little appeal among voters.  In highly diverse societies with proportional 
electoral systems that have more moderate levels of presidential party system fragmentation, the 
negative partial coefficient could easily have no net effect on legislative party system 
fragmentation.   
Conclusion 
The findings presented here suggest that institutional and social cleavage effects on party 
systems are learned through experience with elections.  These results support the growing body 
of theory and evidence maintaining that the effects of institutions and social cleavages on party 
system fragmentation are conditioned by (consecutive) experience with elections.  One of the 
primary implications of these findings is that democratic institutions require several consecutive 
elections before parties and voters fully understand them.  Parties may well require several 
elections before they fully understand both the rules of the electoral system and the level of 
sophistication of voters.  Given the informational ambiguities facing both voters and parties in 
the early stages of democratic elections, it may take an electoral drubbing or two for parties to 
adjust to the effects of district magnitude and the presidential party system, and for parties to 
reflect the social diversity of the (decreasingly volatile) electorate accurately, which may require 
new parties to enter the electoral scene.  Parties may face a stronger incentive than voters to learn 
quickly, as many voters pay attention to politics only during elections.  On the other hand, voters 
also face considerable incentives to learn so as not to waste their votes on hopeless parties.  This 
supports recent work emphasizing the importance of voters possessing accurate information for 
strategic voting to occur (e.g. Blais and Turgeon, 2004; Clough, 2007).  Regardless, it seems that 
both voters and parties need rather considerable practice to begin to respond to institutional 
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constraints as predicted in the literature focusing on advanced industrial democracies.   
In addition to demonstrating that the effects of electoral systems are conditioned by 
consecutive experience with elections, this paper contributes to the literature by showing that the 
effects of variables relating to the presidential system are conditioned by experience with 
elections in the same way as variables related to electoral systems.  Together with the results 
regarding the effects of the electoral system and ethnic diversity, this finding demonstrates 
further that experience with elections has important consequences for the number of parties.  
With more electoral experience, the effects of presidential party systems on legislative party 
systems in developing countries begin to mirror those repeatedly demonstrated in studies of party 
system fragmentation in advanced industrial democracies, as voters and parties learn more about 
one another and how to behave strategically enough so as to limit the number of wasted votes 
cast.  Consistent with Lindberg (2004, 2006), these findings suggest that voters and parties learn 
how to operate in elections only through repeated practice.   
One particular area for future research would be to examine how other cleavage effects 
change over time to determine the robustness of the findings presented here regarding ethnic 
diversity.  The findings of this study are limited to a certain extent by the fact that we follow 
established practice in the literature and only examine the effects of ethnic diversity on party 
system fragmentation.  If the effects of other cleavages develop with experience with elections in 
much the same manner as the effects of ethnic diversity have been shown to develop in this 
paper, this would confirm the findings presented here.  If differences in the effects of other 
cleavages arise, this might help us to learn more about why some party systems consolidate more 
quickly and more fully than others, as some cleavage structures may be more conducive to the 
development of stable party systems.   
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Table 1: The Effects of Experience with Elections on Party System Fragmentation (ENEP) 
 
 Measure of Ethnic Diversity 
Independent Variables Fearon Ethnic Power 
Relations 
LogM 0.10 (0.19) -0.03 (0.22) 
Ethnic  -0.13 (0.07)† -0.09 (0.18) 
LogM x Ethnic  0.12 (0.18) 0.24 (0.20) 
Upper Tier 0.03 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)** 
Upper Tier x Ethnic  -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Proximity -4.29 (1.00)** -3.95 (0.96)** 
ENPRES 1.08 (0.39)** 1.12 (0.41)** 
Proximity x ENPRES 0.35 (0.37) 0.13 (0.38) 
Number of Elections -0.36 (0.12)** -0.38 (0.14)** 
Number of Elections x LogM 0.09 (0.05) 0.12 (0.06)* 
Number of Elections x Ethnic  0.15 (0.05)** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Number of Elections x LogM x Ethnic  0.01 (0.06) -0.05 (0.05) 
Number of Elections x Proximity 0.32 (0.28) 0.28 (0.27) 
Number of Elections x ENPRES -0.26 (0.11)* -0.26 (0.11)* 
Number of Elections x Proximity x ENPRES 0.15 (0.12) 0.21 (0.13) 
Constant 4.20 (0.47)** 4.30 (0.56)** 
Joint Significance: LogM + Interactions 10.30** 11.22** 
Joint Significance: Ethnic + Interactions 5.65** 13.17** 
Joint Significance: ENPRES + Interactions 3.99* 4.20* 
Adjusted R
2
  0.34 0.34 
n  755 721 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Entries are ordinary least squares linear regression coefficients 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  The three joint 
significance tests test the alternative hypotheses, e.g., LogM + (Number of Elections x LogM) ≠ 0 against the null 
hypothesis that all specified effects jointly equal zero.   
 
  
22 
 
Figure 1: The Effect of Experience with Elections on Party System Fragmentation 
 
 
The solid line reflects the predicted values of party system fragmentation across the range of the experience with 
elections variable.  Dashed lines reflect 90 percent confidence intervals for each set of predicted values.   Note that 
the predicted values are generated by assuming countries at the lowest level of ethnic diversity with single-member 
districts (i.e. LogM = 0) without upper tiers or presidential systems.   
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Figure 2: The Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Party System Fragmentation, Conditional on 
Experience with Elections 
 
 
Solid lines reflect the predicted values of party system fragmentation across the range of the effective number of 
ethnic groups (ENEG) variable for countries experiencing their first election since the (re-)instalment of elections 
(black) and countries experiencing five or more consecutive elections (grey).  Dashed lines reflect 90 percent 
confidence intervals for each set of predicted values.    
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Figure 3: The Effect of District Magnitude on Party System Fragmentation, Conditional on 
Experience with Elections 
 
 
Solid black lines are the predicted values of party system fragmentation, with the dashed lines above and below the 
predicted values reflecting 90 percent confidence intervals.  The horizontal dashed line delineates the predicted 
value of party system fragmentation when all other variables are held at zero (i.e. the constant).    
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Figure 4: The Effect of Presidential Candidate Fragmentation on Party System Fragmentation, 
Conditional on Experience with Elections 
 
 
Solid lines reflect the predicted values of party system fragmentation across the range of the effective number of 
presidential candidates (ENPRES) variable for countries experiencing their first election since the (re-)instalment of 
elections (black) and countries experiencing five or more consecutive elections (grey).  Dashed lines reflect 90 
percent confidence intervals for each set of predicted values.   
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Appendix Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
ENEP (Party System Fragmentation) 4.02  1.96 
LogM 1.36 1.32 
Ethnic – Fearon and Laitin 0.88 1.18 
Ethnic – Ethnic Power Relations 0.78 1.12 
Upper Tier 6.06 13.55 
Proximity 0.29 0.41 
ENPRES 1.27 1.65 
Number of Elections 3.33 1.25 
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Appendix Table A.2: List of Countries by Consecutive Experience with Elections 
 
Countries (Year) with One Election 
Argentina (1946, 1963, 
1973, 1983) 
Armenia (1995) Benin (1991) Bhutan (2008) 
Brazil (1958, 1982) Burundi (1993, 2005) Czechoslovakia (1990) Ecuador (1979) 
Fiji (1992) Germany (1949) Ghana (1979) Greece (1974) 
Hungary (1990) Indonesia (1999) Israel (1949) Macedonia (1994) 
Malawi (1994) Mali (1992) Nepal (1991) Netherlands (1946) 
Niger (1993) Nigeria (1999) Pakistan (1977, 1990, 
2008) 
Paraguay (1989) 
Peru (1963, 1980, 2001) Philippines (1946) Poland (1991) Sierra Leone (1996, 
2002) 
Spain (1977) Thailand (1992, 2011) Turkey (1961, 1973, 
1983) 
Uganda (1980) 
 
Countries (Year) with Two Consecutive Elections 
Albania (1992) Argentina (1965, 1985) Armenia (1999) Austria (1949) 
Benin (1995) Brazil (1947, 1962, 1986) Bulgaria (1991) Central African Republic 
(1998) 
Chile (1993) Croatia (1992) Czechoslovakia (1992) East Timor (2007) 
Ecuador (1984) El Salvador (1985) Fiji (1994) Germany (1953) 
Greece (1977) Guatemala (1966) Hungary (1994) Indonesia (2004) 
Israel (1951) Japan (1947) Latvia (1993) Liberia (2005) 
Lithuania (1992) Macedonia (1998) Malawi (1999) Moldova (1998) 
Mongolia (1992) Nepal (1994) Netherlands (1948) Nicaragua (1990) 
Nigeria (2003) Norway (1949) Pakistan (1993) Paraguay (1993) 
Peru (1985, 2006) Philippines (1949, 1992) Poland (1993) Portugal (1976) 
Sierra Leone (2007) Slovakia (1998) Spain (1979) Sri Lanka (1952) 
Thailand (1983, 1992) Turkey (1977, 1987) Venezuela (1963)  
 
Countries (Year) with Three Consecutive Elections 
Albania (1996) Argentina (1951, 1987) Armenia (2003) Austria (1953) 
Bangladesh (1991) Brazil (1950, 1990) Bulgaria (1994) Chile (1997) 
Croatia (1995) Cyprus (1985) Czech Republic (2002) Ecuador (1986) 
El Salvador (1988) Fiji (1999) France (1946) Germany (1957) 
Guinea Bissau (2008) Greece (1981) Guatemala (1970) Hungary (1998) 
Indonesia (2009) Israel (1955) Japan (1949) Kenya (2002) 
Latvia (1995) Lithuania (1996) Macedonia (2002) Mali (1997) 
Mongolia (1996) Myanmar (1956) Nepal (1999) Netherlands (1952) 
Nicaragua (1996) Nigeria (1964, 2007) Norway (1953) Panama (1960) 
Paraguay (1998) Peru (1990, 2011) Philippines (1953, 1995) Poland (1997) 
Portugal (1979) Spain (1982) Sri Lanka (1956) Thailand (1986, 1995) 
Turkey (1969, 1991) Venezuela (1968)   
 
Countries (Year) with Four Consecutive Elections 
Albania (1997) Argentina (1954, 1989) Austria (1956) Benin (2003) 
Bangladesh (1996) Brazil (1954, 1994) Bulgaria (1997) Chile (2001) 
Croatia (2000) Cyprus (1991) Czech Republic (2006) Dominican Republic 
(1978) 
Ecuador (1988) El Salvador (1991) France (1951) Germany (1961) 
Ghana (2004) Greece (1952, 1985) Guatemala (1994) Hungary (2002) 
Israel (1959) Japan (1952) Kyrgyzstan (2007) Latvia (1998) 
Lithuania (2000) Macedonia (2006) Mongolia (2000) Netherlands (1956) 
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Nicaragua (2001) Norway (1957) Paraguay (2003) Philippines (1957, 1998) 
Poland (2001) Portugal (1980) Slovakia (2006) Somalia (1964) 
Spain (1986) Sri Lanka (1960) Thailand (1988, 1996) Turkey (1995) 
Ukraine (2006) Venezuela (1973)   
 
Countries (Year) with Five or More Consecutive Elections 
Albania (2001, 2005, 
2009) 
Argentina (1958, 1960, 
1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 
1999, 2001) 
Australia (1946, 1949, 
1951, 1954, 1955, 1958, 
1961, 1963, 1966, 1969, 
1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 
1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 
1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2004, 2007, 2010) 
Austria (1959, 1962, 
1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 
1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 
1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 
2006, 2008) 
Belgium (2003, 2007, 
2010) 
Bangladesh (2001, 2008) Brazil (1998, 2002, 2006, 
2010) 
Bulgaria (2001, 2005, 
2009) 
Canada (1949, 1953, 
1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, 
1965, 1968, 1972, 1974, 
1979, 1980, 1984, 1988, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2011) 
Chile (1949, 1953, 1957, 
1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 
2005, 2009) 
Colombia (1974, 1978, 
1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 
1994, 2006, 2010) 
Costa Rica (1953, 1958, 
1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 
1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 
1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 
2010) 
Croatia (2003, 2007) Cyprus (1996, 2001, 
2006, 2011) 
Czech Republic (2010) Denmark (1947, 1950, 
1953 [Apr.], 1953 [Sep.], 
1957, 1960, 1964, 1966, 
1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 
1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 
1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 
2011) 
Dominican Republic 
(1982, 1990, 1994, 1998, 
2002, 2006, 2010) 
Ecuador (1990, 1992, 
1994, 1996, 1998, 2006, 
2009) 
El Salvador (1994, 1997, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009) 
Finland (1948, 1951, 
1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 
1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 
1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 
1999, 2003, 2007, 2011) 
France (1956, 1958, 
1962, 1967, 1968, 1973, 
1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 
1993, 1997, 2002, 2007) 
Germany (1965, 1969, 
1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 
1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 
2002, 2005, 2009) 
Ghana (2008) Greece (1956, 1989, 
1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2007, 2009) 
Georgia (2008) Guatemala (1995, 1999, 
2007, 2011) 
Honduras (1997, 2001, 
2005, 2009) 
Hungary (2006, 2010) 
India (1962, 1967, 1971, 
1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 
1991, 1999, 2004, 2009) 
Ireland (1948, 1951, 
1954, 1957, 1961, 1965, 
1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 
1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 
1997, 2002, 2007, 2011) 
Israel (1961, 1965, 1969, 
1973, 1977, 1981, 1984, 
1988, 1992, 1996, 1999, 
2001, 2006, 2009) 
Italy (1994, 1996, 2001, 
2006, 2008) 
Jamaica (1962, 1967, 
1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 
1989, 1993, 1997, 2002, 
2007, 2011) 
Japan (1953, 1955, 1958, 
1960, 1963, 1967, 1969, 
1972, 1976, 1979, 1980, 
1983, 1986, 1990, 1993, 
1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 
2009) 
Latvia (2002, 2006, 2010, 
2011) 
Lithuania (2004, 2008) 
Macedonia (2008, 2011) Mexico (2000, 2003, 
2006, 2009) 
Moldova (2009 [Apr.], 
2009 [Jul.], 2010) 
Mongolia (2004, 2008) 
Netherlands (1959, 1963, 
1967, 1971, 1972, 1977, 
New Zealand (1946, 
1949, 1951, 1954, 1957, 
Nicaragua (2006, 2011) Niger (2004) 
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1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 
1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 
2006, 2010) 
1960, 1963, 1966, 1969, 
1972, 1975, 1978, 1981, 
1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 
1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 
2008, 2011 
Norway (1961, 1965, 
1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 
1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 
2001, 2005, 2009) 
Panama (1994, 1999, 
2004, 2009) 
Paraguay (2008) Peru (1962) 
Philippines (1961, 1965) Poland (2005, 2007, 
2011) 
Portugal (1983, 1985, 
1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 
2002, 2005, 2009) 
Senegal (2001, 2007) 
Serbia (& Montenegro) 
(2000, 2003, 2007, 2008) 
Slovakia (2010) South Korea (2000, 2004, 
2008) 
Spain (1989, 1993, 1996, 
2000, 2004, 2008) 
Sri Lanka (1960, 1965, 
1970, 1977, 1989, 1994, 
2000, 2001, 2004, 2010) 
Sweden (1948, 1952, 
1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 
1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 
1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 
2006, 2010) 
Switzerland (1947, 1951, 
1957, 1959, 1963, 1967, 
1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 
1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2011) 
Taiwan (1998, 2001, 
2004, 2008) 
Thailand (2001, 2005) Trinidad and Tobago 
(1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 
1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2007, 2010) 
Turkey (1999, 2001, 
2007, 2011) 
United Kingdom (1945, 
1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, 
1964, 1966, 1970, 1974 
[Feb.], 1974 [Oct.], 1979, 
1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 
2001, 2005, 2010) 
Ukraine (2007) USA (1946, 1948, 1950, 
1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 
1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 
1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 
1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 
1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010) 
Venezuela (1978, 1983, 
1988, 1993, 1998, 2000, 
2005, 2010) 
 
Note: for each level of experience with democracy, entries are the elections (years) in each country.  Note that only 
countries with valid (non-system missing) data are included.   
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1
 Following Golder (2007), we drop all elections from the data set where the ‘other’ category 
used to calculate ENEP exceeds 15 percent, all non-competitive elections, all elections using a 
fused vote in presidential and legislative elections, and countries with majoritarian upper tiers.   
2
 Recognising that this rule omits several African countries where dominant one-party systems 
are prominent (which in turn might undermine the effects of experience with elections), we re-
ran the analysis by including additional African countries collected by Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder (2007).  Additionally, to rule out the possibility that the results are due to the inclusion of 
countries that are so well-established that they distort the conclusions that would be drawn by 
looking at a sample including only developing democracies, we also examined models excluding 
countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  The results of these 
robustness tests (presented in the Supplementary File confirm those presented here.   
3
 Because most countries have at least some experience with elections during their history, we 
examined whether countries truly holding their first-ever elections were different from those 
countries holding their first elections since a suspension in their electoral histories.  The results 
of these additional analyses (seen in the Supplementary File) justify treating all countries 
experiencing their first consecutive election as equivalent.    
4
 Because the time variable (elections) is not regularly spaced once several cases were deleted, 
we were unable to use alternative estimators such as Newey-West standard errors.   
5
 We also tested and found support for the assumption that the effect of the election experience 
variable is linear (see the Supplementary File).   
6
 We have truncated the scale in this figure to six due to the fact that values greater than six are 
outlying, constituting less than one percent of the sample.   
